According to preliminary data, Poland's GDP in 2025 grew by 3.6% after a 3.0% increase the previous year, in line with consensus and our forecast. The largest part of this growth was attributable to private consumption (an acceleration from 2.9% to 3.7%), but public consumption also played a role (an increase of 4.7%) as did investment (an acceleration from -0.9% to 4.2%). The contributions of net exports and changes in inventories were close to zero this time.

GDP growth and its components (annual average, %)

Source: GUS, Macrobond, Pekao Analizy

As usual, we are more interested in the implications for economic growth in the fourth quarter itself and its trajectory in subsequent periods, rather than the average for the whole year. So, to summarise:

• GDP in the fourth quarter increased by 4–4.2% yoy (we assumed an increase of 3.9% yoy).
• Private consumption rose by 4.1–4.4% yoy (we assumed an increase of 4% yoy).
• Public consumption maintained its high pace from the third quarter. GUS does not provide this category separately in the annual estimate, but we can estimate that public consumption grew by 7% yoy.
• Investments rose by 4.3–4.5% yoy (we assumed an increase of 6.5% yoy).
• Net exports contributed about 0.3 percentage points, while the change in inventories subtracted about 0.9 percentage points from GDP growth in the fourth quarter.

Private consumption was stronger at the end of the year than we had assumed consumer sentiment or retail sales data indicated. The fact is, however, that at the end of the year, real wage growth was at its strongest since the exceptional, one-off 2024. In our view, in 2026, the growth rate of real household income should come down slightly, dragging consumption growth down with it. Strong data from the end of 2025 create upside risk for this forecast right at the outset. However, this is a risk we have been aware of. If consumers reduce their savings rate or turn more decisively to credit, this will provide additional fuel for consumption, which, in our opinion, current income will not supply. Public consumption is traditionally very difficult to forecast, but its result in the second half of 2025 (over 7% yoy) may still come as a surprise.

Investment at the end of 2025 rose more slowly than we had forecast, but the discrepancy is within the standards to which this data accustomed us in 2025. This year is shaping up to be far less volatile, and the swell in public sector expenditure (especially those financed from EU funds) should drive investment growth to nearly 10% on average. Everything that was supposed to be realised in 2025 but was delayed will be made up for in 2026.

The performance  of the Polish economy at the end of 2025 is slightly better than our forecasts, but consistent with the generally positive scenario for the following quarters. For some time now, we have assumed that GDP growth would accelerate to 4%, and in our latest forecast publication we added upside risks to this figure. It is too early to say that such risks are materialising, but it can safely be said that forecasts not assuming an acceleration in 2026 are not realistic.

GDP growth implied by the yield curve (% yoy)

Source: GUS, Refinitiv, Pekao Analizy