Retail sales (constant prices, % yoy)

Source: Statistics Poland, Macrobond, Pekao Research

In the first half of 2026, retail sales rose by 4.8% yoy, and it is highly likely that this year will be the third consecutive year in which sales have accelerated. In a sense, this also marks a return to normal – retail sales growth in 2010-2019 averaged exactly… 4.8%. There is another aspect of normalization – in terms of its structure. Spring was marked by significant disruptions in sales:

• food – due to the shift in the timing of Easter,
• fuel – stockpiling of fuel following the outbreak of the Gulf War,
• clothing and footwear – due to weather fluctuations,
• durable goods – deterioration in consumer sentiment and a reduction in discretionary spending following the outbreak of the war.

Retail sales (constant prices, category breakdown, % yoy)

Source: Statistics Poland, Macrobond, Pekao Research

These factors are almost entirely absent from June’s sales figures – the only exception being fuel consumption, which was boosted by the planned phaseout of indirect tax cuts (+1.4% mom, about 4–5 percentage points above our projections). Food sales also turned out to be slightly better than forecast (+1.8% yoy after two months of declines), and these two categories are responsible for the positive surprise. In the rest of the sales data, the return of double-digit growth in durable goods sales (+14.9% yoy) is also noteworthy – the World Cup may have helped somewhat here, but we would not overestimate this factor.

Acceleration / slowdown in retail sales and real wages (p.p. yoy)

Source: Statistics Poland, Macrobond, Pekao Research

Strong sales figures pose something of a puzzle for economists. Sales have been accelerating despite a marked slowdown in real income – the latter resulting from both lower growth in nominal income (primarily wages) and an unexpected rise in inflation. Real wages already slowed by 1 pp. in the first half of the year, and in the coming months the decline will reach 2 pp. So why aren’t we seeing the effects in spending? This may stem from weak demand for consumer services – the low growth rate of private consumption in the first quarter clearly pointed to this. Another possibility (let’s be frank, a wildcard) is consumption smoothing, which in the Polish context is somewhat speculative in nature, but we won’t rule it out. It’s also worth remembering that consumption generally reacts to inflationary shocks with a slight delay. A weaker second half of the year would be entirely consistent with this pattern. Finally, incomes and retail sales aren’t as strongly correlated as one might think, for reasons listed above. The first half of the year fits well within the historical pattern. So perhaps we’re not dealing with a mystery after all?